목차
Title page
Contents
Abstract 3
Non-technical Summary 4
1. Introduction 6
2. The model 8
3. Central bank runs and optimal allocations 13
4. The classic policy goal: Price-level targeting 18
5. CBDCs and resolving the trilemma 26
6. Decentralization with firms and private banks 29
7. Nominal deposits vs. CBDC vs. cash 33
References 35
Online Appendix 37
A. Proofs 37
B. Decentralization with firms and private banks 38
C. Fixing the Trilemma 50
D. Extensions 50
E. Bank runs vs. spending runs 52
Acknowledgements 55
Figure 1/Figure 2. The red run-deterrence bound is an upper bound on liquidations as a function of n. For n = λ, the social optimum, y*, is below the upper bound... 15
Figure 2/Figure 3. Fully price-stable policies are run-deterring but do not reach the social optimum y*. Partially price-stable policies are not run-deterring but can reach... 20
Figure 3/Figure 4. Subgame perfect liquidation policies and their pricing implication 24
Figure 4/Figure 5. Subgame perfect liquidation policies and their pricing implication when P is set minimally so that the liquidation is run-proof for n 〈 1 25
Figure 5/Figure 6. Adjustment of the price target P as a function of α required to achieve a run-deterring liquidation policy in the subgame perfect equilibrium, provided... 26
Figure 6/Figure 7. The financial system with CBDC: Households, firms, banks, and the central bank 49
