목차
9 Executive Summary
9 Russian Conventional Military Capabilities as of 2025
11 Russian Military Reconstitution
14 Implications for Western Analysts and Policymakers
16 Introduction
16 The Challenges of Assessing Russian Military Capabilities and Reconstitution Efforts
19 Structure and Methodology
21 Chapter 1: Russian Military Culture
22 Introduction
22 The Russian Military’s Approach to Studying War
26 The (Idealized) Russian Way of War: Tactical Rigidity Enabling Operational Effectiveness
26 The Russian Military Personnel Model Before 2022
29 The Russian Version of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP): Tactical Simplicity Enabling Speed and Operational Effectiveness
31 Misperceptions of the Soviet Use of Mass in WWII
34 Russian Views of Modern Conventional War Pre-February 2022
37 Conclusion
38 Chapter 2: Russian Military Capabilities in 2025
39 Introduction
39 The Russian Military in Ukraine and the Levels of War
41 Strategic Level: The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff
41 The Security Council
41 Structure of the Russian Armed Forces
44 The General Staff and the National Defense Management Center
48 Operational-Strategic Level: Theater Command and Groups of Forces
48 Russia’s Theater Command Structure in Ukraine
52 Military Districts, OSKs, and Groups of Forces
57 Upper Tactical Level: Armies to Regiments/Brigades
57 Army and Corps Headquarters
59 Divisions, Regiments, and Brigades
61 Lower Tactical Level: BTGs and Assault Groups
61 The Failure of Battalion Tactical Groups
63 Optimization for Positional Warfare: Assault Groups
68 Other Capabilities
68 Tactical Fires
71 Air Power
73 C2 and Battlefield Initiative
75 Conclusion: December 1941, not June 1944
78 Chapter 3: Forecasting Russian Military Reconstitution
79 Introduction
80 Defining Reconstitution and Time Horizons
82 The Russian Military’s Possible Reconstitution Pathways
88 Current Russian Command Culture Will Impede Learning and Reconstitution Efforts
88 Yes-Men and Factionalism in the Russian Military
91 The Russian Military Will Not Be Able to Honestly Discuss Lessons
92 The Russians Will Likely Design an Incoherent Reconstitution Plan
94 Positive Institutional Pressures Will Drive the Russian Military to Innovate
97 Conclusion
101 Bibliography
107 Endnotes
