목차
Title page
Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. From hyperglobalisation to deglobalisation? 4
3. Slowdown of trade in goods: the role of protectionism 8
3.1. MFN applied tariffs did not change much 9
3.2. Regional arrangements cover more trade and are deeper 10
3.3. Non-tariff measures are everywhere but the evidence is weak that they are more prevalent since the GFC, or that their intent is predominantly protectionist 12
3.4. Subsidy interventions have increased across the world since the GFC; however industrial subsidies in the EU and the US are unlikely to have had a significant... 15
3.5. Summary: trade in goods remains quite free, possibly freer than before the GFC 18
4. Other channels of globalisation 19
4.1. Services are highly protected, though no more than before, and continue to globalise because ICT facilitates their tradeability 19
4.2. Capital flows provide the clearest example of deglobalisation, but not because of protectionism 22
4.3. Migration is the most impeded channel of globalisation, but is not stopping 23
4.4. Technology transfer is probably occurring more easily than before 25
5. Conclusion: drivers of globalisation and implications for policy 26
References 29
Appendix 33
Table 1. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index: Average Across all Sectors 21
Table 2. Services Trade Restrictiveness Index: Average Across 50 Countries 21
Figure 1. Trade 2
Figure 2. Change in Annual Trade/GDP for non-oil-exporting countries 6
Figure 3. Trade in intermediates growing rapidly World and regional exports of intermediate goods (excl. fuels), Q2 2019-Q2 2022 7
Figure 4. Share of world trade covered by trade agreement 11
Figure 5. Harmful interventions by type 14
Figure 6. Evolution of subsidies 15
Figure 7. Capital flows by type and region, as % of world GDP 23
Figure 8. Stock of migrants as percentage of population 24
Figure 9. personal remittances, received 25
Table 1. Change in trade/GDP ratio of non-oil exporting countries 33
Table 2. Change in trade/GDP ratio of oil exporting countries 36
