Acknowledgments V

Acronyms and Abbreviations VI

Introduction 1

  Offshore Wind in the United States 1

The Evolving Threat Landscape in the Maritime Domain 4

  Maritime and Subsea Infrastructure Is Increasingly Vulnerable 4

  Advances in Autonomous Systems Are Expanding Threats 5

  Maritime Threats Are Not Limited to State Actors 5

  The Maritime Domain Is Growing Harder to Monitor with Traditional Surveillance 6

Current U.S. Approach to Early Warning and Detection of Maritime Threats 7

  Department of Homeland Security 7

  The U.S. Navy 8

Offshore Energy Infrastructure as a Potential Force Multiplier for Surveillance 10

  The Strategic Positioning of Offshore Wind Infrastructure 11

  Expanding Offshore Monitoring with Distributed Acoustic Sensing 12

  Moving to an Integrated Sensing Network 12

  Longer-Term Models: Offshore Wind Security Hubs 13

Security Risks and Their Mitigation 14

Europe as a Test Case 16

  Multilateral Efforts 16

  Country Models 17

    Poland: Mandatory Military Integration 17

    Belgium: Civilian Data Sharing Without Militarization 18

    The Netherlands: Institutional Coordination and Non-Price Criteria 18

    Norway: Testing to Validate Surveillance Methods for Maritime Infrastructure Protection 18

    United Kingdom: Addressing Radar Interference While Advancing Security 19

Recommendations 21

    Establish Clear Lines of Ownership and Obligation for Dual-Use Offshore Wind Infrastructure 21

    Incorporate National Security Enhancement into the Existing Offshore Wind Review Process 22

    Strengthen Co-funding Mechanisms for Dual-Use Technologies 23

    Build Regional Collaboration on Shared Infrastructure and Sensing Zones 24

Conclusion 25

Appendix: Ocean Zones and Maritime Infrastructure 26

About the Authors 28

About CSIS 30

Endnotes 31