
□ 보고서에 따르면 OECD의 실업률은 2025년 5월 기준 4.9%로, 1년 전과 동일한 수준을 유지함. 그러나 많은 국가에서 고용 성장의 둔화와 코로나19 이전 수준의 노동시장 경색 조짐이 나타남
ㅇ 한국의 실업률은 2025년 5월 기준 2.7%를 나타내고 있으며, 2024년 5월 기준 2.8%, 2023년 5월 기준 2.5%로 나타나 팬데믹 이후 기간 동안 3%이하의 실업률을 유지하고 있음. 한국의 고용률은 2023년 1분기 68.8%, 2024년 1분기 69.5%, 2025년 1분기 69.7%로 지속적으로 증가세를 보임. 같은 기간 동안 남성의 고용률은 여성의 고용률보다 10%포인트 이상 높은 수준임. 고용률은 팬데믹 이후 지속적으로 증가하고 있지만, OECD 평균에는 하회한 상태임
□ 실질임금은 거의 모든 OECD 회원국에서 증가하고 있지만, 그 중 절반에서는 팬데믹 이후 이어진 인플레이션 급등 직전인 2021년 초 수준의 임금을 여전히 밑돌고 있음
ㅇ 한국의 실질임금은 지난 몇 년간 지속적으로 상승세를 이어오고 있으며, 특히 2021년 1분기 이후 누적 기준으로 2.9%를 초과하는 강한 증가세를 기록하며 OECD 중위값을 상회함. 법정 최저임금은 지속적으로 인상되어 왔으며, 2025년의 명목 최저임금은 2021년 대비 15% 증가함. 그러나 2021년 1분기 이후의 고물가 영향으로 실질 최저임금의 증가율은 0.8%에 그치고 있음
□ OECD 국가에서는 2060년까지 노동 연령 인구 1인당 노인 인구의 수가 67% 증가할 것으로 예측됨. 정책 변화가 없을 경우, 고용률은 감소하고 연간 1인당 GDP 성장률이 0.4 %포인트 둔화될 것으로 예상됨
ㅇ 한국의 노동 연령 인구는 팬데믹 이후 지속적으로 감소함. 15세부터 64세까지의 인구는 2020년 3,664만 명에서 2024년에는 3,562만 명으로 감소함. 특히, 한국은 2022년에 0.78%, 2023년에는 0.72%의 출생률을 보이고 있어, OECD 국가 중 가장 낮은 출생률을 기록함. 이 인구 구조적 변화는 노동시장에 커다란 영향을 미치고 있음. 한국의 고용률은 2023년부터 2060년까지 8.1% 감소할 것으로 예측됨. 이 수치는 OECD 평균인 1.9% 감소를 크게 상회하는 수준임
ㅇ 한국 정부는 평생 학습 강화, 정년 연장 촉진, 고령자 재고용 지원, 육아 휴직 확대 및 출산휴가 강화 등 다양한 정책을 통해 노동 수명 연장 등을 추진함으로써 노동시장의 인구 구조의 변화, 특히 고령화와 노동력 인구 감소에 적극적으로 대응하고 있음
[출처] OECD 2025 고용전망: 대한민국 (2025.07.09.) / OECD
목차
Title page 1
Contents 9
Foreword 4
Editorial: From job shortage to labour shortage: The new challenge of population ageing 5
Executive summary 14
1. Bouncing back, but on shaky ground: Wages continue to recover in uncertain labour markets 17
In Brief 18
Introduction 19
1.1. Labour markets have been supported by resilient economic growth but there are early signs of slowdown 19
1.1.1. Labour markets have remained resilient 20
1.1.2. Labour markets are expected to slowdown in 2025 and 2026 24
1.1.3. Hours worked per capita continued their declining trend 24
1.2. Labour shortages continued to ease but labour markets remain tight 26
1.2.1. Labour market tightness is back to pre-COVID-19 levels in many countries and sectors but remains high 26
1.2.2. Matching efficiency deteriorated between the onset of the pandemic and mid-2022 but is now back to pre-pandemic levels 29
1.2.3. Tight labour markets may have contributed to changes in part-time employment patterns 30
1.3. Real wages are growing in virtually all OECD countries but there is still room for catching up in many of them 35
1.3.1. Real wages are growing year-on-year in virtually all OECD countries but remain below early 2021 levels in half of them 36
1.3.2. The wages of the lowest-paid workers have proved more resilient than median wages to the inflation surge 40
1.3.3. As real wages keep on recovering, unit profits continue to lose the ground gained during the inflation surge 45
1.4. Concluding remarks 47
References 48
Annex 1.A. Additional results 51
Notes 66
2. Setting the scene: Demographic change, economic growth and intergenerational inequalities 68
In Brief 69
Introduction 71
2.1. Population ageing: Past and future trends 72
2.2. Population ageing and economic growth 76
2.3. Potential gains from mobilising untapped labour resources 79
2.3.1. Is a sufficient recovery in productivity growth in sight? 79
2.3.2. Complementary scenarios for mobilising untapped labour resources 81
2.3.3. Combining potential gains from different mobilisation strategies 91
2.4. Inequalities in living standards across generations 94
2.4.1. Older generations have benefited from higher income growth than the young 95
2.4.2. Intergenerational disparities in household wealth are also large, as older generations have benefited from booming asset markets 99
2.4.3. The poverty risk has shifted from the old to the young 101
2.5. Concluding remarks 104
References 105
Annex 2.A. Additional Figures 117
Notes 127
3. Navigating the golden years: Making the labour market work for older workers 133
In Brief 134
Introduction 135
3.1. Evolving employment trends among mid-to-late career workers 136
3.1.1. Employment rates have increased but significant disparities across OECD countries remain 136
3.1.2. Employment rates lag behind for women, low skilled workers and those in poor health 139
3.1.3. Once unemployed it is harder for older workers to get back into work and inactivity rises with age 141
3.1.4. A lifecycle perspective is critical to supporting employment at older ages as being employed in your 50s is strongly correlated with employment in your 60s 143
3.1.5. Good job quality is important for ensuring that older workers remain employed 145
3.2. Strengthening incentives for longer working lives 153
3.2.1. The labour market effects and behavioural responses of raising the eligibility age for pensions 155
3.2.2. Pension reforms for those in hazardous jobs 158
3.2.3. Flexible retirement may help facilitate longer working lives 158
3.3. Boosting the hiring and retention of older workers 162
3.3.1. Keeping people at the end of their career is difficult 163
3.3.2. Overcoming age discrimination in the workplace 164
3.3.3. Multigenerational workforces can boost firm productivity 167
3.3.4. Aligning wages with performance, not age 169
3.4. Promoting the employability of workers throughout their working lives 170
3.4.1. Supporting employers in introducing age management practices in the workplace 170
3.4.2. Employee-oriented flexible working conditions help workers stay in employment 171
3.4.3. Greater policy effort is needed to support women's employment 172
3.4.4. Job and career mobility can play a key role in supporting employment at older ages 172
3.4.5. Early interventions are crucial to prevent workers with disabilities from exiting the labour market 173
3.5. Concluding remarks 177
References 178
Annex 3.A. Additional charts 189
Notes 201
4. Staying in the game: Skills and jobs of older workers in a changing labour market 205
In Brief 206
Introduction 208
4.1. Generational divide or age-related decline: How will productivity evolve with age in the future? 208
4.1.1. Information-processing skills decline as individuals grow older 208
4.1.2. The adjustment to the changing demand in the labour market happens predominantly through younger workers 214
4.1.3. The changing occupational composition of the economy may help workers stay productive for longer 217
4.2. Lifelong learning: The key to ageing well - but are workers using it? 219
4.2.1. Training participation and learning-by-doing decrease with age 219
4.2.2. Large differences in training participation of older workers are observed across countries in the OECD 222
4.2.3. Older workers train less due to lower expected returns, but they may also be underestimating the benefits of training 223
4.3. Policy solutions: Support mid-career and older workers now to age better tomorrow 226
4.3.1. Career guidance for adults 226
4.3.2. Support to participate in training for mid-career and older individuals 229
4.4. Concluding remarks 232
References 233
Annex 4.A. Additional results 239
Notes 245
5. Reviving growth in a time of workforce ageing: The role of job mobility 247
In Brief 248
Introduction 250
5.1. Setting the scene 253
5.1.1. Growth has weakened and become less broadly shared 253
5.1.2. Slower growth may in part reflect a decline in the pace of growth-enhancing job reallocation between firms 255
5.1.3. Workforce ageing tends to slow worker mobility 257
5.2. Growth, reallocation and ageing 258
5.2.1. Job mobility, job reallocation and growth 259
5.2.2. The role of workforce ageing 267
5.3. Policy implications 272
5.3.1. Policies that provide flexibility to firms 272
5.3.2. Policies that support mobility of workers to better firms 273
5.3.3. Policies directed at securing and supporting the mobility of mid-career and older workers 279
5.4. Concluding remarks 281
References 283
Annex 5.A. Supplementary material 290
Notes 298
Annex A. Statistical annex 301
Figures 10
Figure 1.1. GDP growth slowed down in Q1 2025 after several years of resilient pace 20
Figure 1.2. Unemployment rates remain low 21
Figure 1.3. Employment rates continued to rise in many countries in 2024 but at a slower pace than in 2023 22
Figure 1.4. Labour force participation rates continued to rise 23
Figure 1.5. OECD labour markets are expected to slow down 24
Figure 1.6. The post-pandemic decline in average hours worked per worker is generally consistent with long-term trends 25
Figure 1.7. Labour market tightness has returned to pre-COVID-19 levels in many countries 27
Figure 1.8. Labour market tightness is close to pre-COVID-19 levels in most sectors in the euro area and the United States but not in Australia 28
Figure 1.9. Beveridge curves shifted outward between the onset of the pandemic and mid-2022 but have now returned to pre-pandemic patterns 30
Figure 1.10. Part-time employment is largely female dominated and mostly voluntary 31
Figure 1.11. The incidence of part-time employment has not changed, but its nature has 32
Figure 1.12. Women experienced a smaller increase in voluntary part-time employment during the COVID-19 recovery than men 33
Figure 1.13. The nature of the post-COVID-19 rise in voluntary part-time differs by gender 34
Figure 1.14. Inflation has fallen significantly since its 2022 peak 35
Figure 1.15. Real wages continued to grow in 2024 but remain below Q1 2021 levels in half of OECD countries 37
Figure 1.16. Posted wages point to a recent slowdown in real wage growth 38
Figure 1.17. Real negotiated wages in selected OECD countries 39
Figure 1.18. Real minimum wages are above January 2021 levels in virtually all countries 41
Figure 1.19. Statutory minimum wages have increased more than median wages in most countries 42
Figure 1.20. There is a clear trend towards wage compression between sectors in the United States but not in Australia and the euro area 43
Figure 1.21. Distribution of gross hourly earnings expressed as a share of the minimum wage in France 44
Figure 1.22. Profits continue to buffer the increase in labour costs 45
Figure 1.23. Unit profits continue to lose the ground gained during the inflation surge in Australia and the euro area 46
Figure 2.1. Population ageing results from slumping fertility and increasing longevity 72
Figure 2.2. Life expectancy is increasing, most of it being spent in full health 73
Figure 2.3. The working-age population will decline in a large number of OECD countries 74
Figure 2.4. The share of older individuals of working age in the total working-age population has increased significantly 75
Figure 2.5. The old-age dependency ratio has soared and will continue to increase 75
Figure 2.6. The share of employed persons in the overall population is projected to decline almost everywhere 77
Figure 2.7. Demographic trends will result in a dramatic slowdown of GDP per capita growth 78
Figure 2.8. Increasing net migration rates may have a moderately beneficial effect on GDP per capita growth in many countries 83
Figure 2.9. Closing the gender gap in employment can deliver large growth dividends 85
Figure 2.10. Equalising hours worked across genders could further attenuate growth slowdown 86
Figure 2.11. Women spend much more time than men on unpaid care and domestic work 88
Figure 2.12. Raising employment of older people could lead to large gains in GDP per capita growth in many countries 90
Figure 2.13. A comprehensive strategy for mobilising labour resources can avoid the fall in employment-to-population ratios 92
Figure 2.14. An overall strategy mobilising labour resources will significantly limit losses in GDP per capita growth 93
Figure 2.15. The relative income position of older people has improved significantly since the mid-1990s 96
Figure 2.16. Income trajectories have become less steep for younger generations in many countries 98
Figure 2.17. The wealth gap in favour of older generations has been widening 100
Figure 2.18. Younger generations are less likely to own a home than they were three decades ago 101
Figure 2.19. In most countries, older people are less likely to live in poverty than children, and their relative poverty risk has declined 102
Figure 3.1. Older workers, especially women are more often in the labour market than ever before 138
Figure 3.2. Employment rates for women and the lower skilled generally lag behind the average in most OECD countries 140
Figure 3.3. Levels of unemployment and inactivity have fallen on average across OECD countries except for a rise in unemployment among those aged 65-69 142
Figure 3.4. Being employed in your 50s is associated with a greater likelihood of employment in your 60s 144
Figure 3.5. Not being employed in one's 50s is correlated with not being employed in one's 60s 145
Figure 3.6. Overall job quality tends to be higher for older workers 146
Figure 3.7. The physical risks in some jobs are high for older workers 147
Figure 3.8. Career prospects, flexible working conditions and job autonomy are key aspects of job quality that vary significantly by age and gender 148
Figure 3.9. There are significant differences in the "age-friendliness" of jobs across OECD countries 150
Figure 3.10. The share of part-time work and self-employment rises with age 152
Figure 3.11. The average age of labour market exit has risen in most OECD countries since 2002, yet the average age of exit is often below the normal retirement age 155
Figure 3.12. The share of people combining pension and labour income remains low at older ages, but enjoying work is the main reason for continuing to work while... 160
Figure 3.13. Many older workers struggle to find new jobs or hold on to their existing ones 164
Figure 3.14. Mid-to-late career workers report widespread experience of age discrimination 166
Figure 3.15. Employees are more productive when they work with others who are of a different age 168
Figure 3.16. Employers expect younger workers to be a better fit when hiring than older workers 169
Figure 3.17. Retirement, illness and job dismissal are the main reason jobless older workers left their job 174
Figure 4.1. Information-processing skills are lower among older workers 209
Figure 4.2. Over the last ten years, the decline in information-processing skills was typically stronger among the older cohort, but the extent of the decline differed... 212
Figure 4.3. Managerial responsibilities and tasks associated with influencing others increased the most over the last decade among younger workers 213
Figure 4.4. The average age increased the most in occupations that decreased in size 215
Figure 4.5. Older workers are less likely to use advanced ICT skills at work than younger workers in the same occupations 216
Figure 4.6. The growth in wages over time differs across occupations 217
Figure 4.7. Some countries have greater shares of jobs that potentially allow workers to remain productive for longer 218
Figure 4.8. Formal and non-formal adult learning and learning-by-doing decrease with age 220
Figure 4.9. The share of the population that participated in training less than they wanted to declines with age as the time barriers due to work and family... 221
Figure 4.10. Participation in non-formal learning among older people is lower than among prime‑age individuals in all countries, but the gap and the level... 222
Figure 4.11. Older workers have lower job mobility, and learning by doing decreases with tenure 224
Figure 4.12. The gap in participation in non-formal learning between older and prime‑age individuals is correlated with effective labour market exit age, especially for women 225
Figure 4.13. Mid-career and older individuals are less likely to look for information on learning possibilities than younger people 227
Figure 5.1. Aggregate productivity growth has weakened and become less broadly shared 254
Figure 5.2. Real wages have decoupled from labour productivity 255
Figure 5.3.The pace of job reallocation has tended to slow 256
Figure 5.4. Within-firm wage and productivity growth has tended to decline 257
Figure 5.5. Workforce ageing is weighing down on worker mobility 258
Figure 5.6. Growth-enhancing job reallocation is primarily driven by job-to-job mobility 261
Figure 5.7. Job-to-job mobility accounts for a large part of aggregate wage and productivity growth 263
Figure 5.8. High wage growth was driven by net job-to-job mobility 264
Figure 5.9. Within and between firm growth both contribute to cross-country differences in aggregate growth rates 266
Figure 5.10. Growth-enhancing job reallocation is most important for young workers 268
Figure 5.11. Ageing weakens aggregate between-firm wage and productivity growth 270
Figure 5.12. Age-segregation across the firm-distribution of wages has deepened slightly 272
Figure 5.13. Wage compression does not have major effects on growth-enhancing job reallocation 277
Boxes 38
Box 1.1. Wages advertised in online vacancies point to a recent slowdown in the growth of real posted wages 38
Box 1.2. Real negotiated wages in selected OECD countries have accentuated their upward trend but remain below the levels reached before the inflation surge 39
Box 1.3. The compression of the wage distribution in France and the United States may reflect different phenomena 44
Box 2.1. Recent increase in healthy life expectancy 73
Box 2.2. Living standards, GDP per capita levels and growth 76
Box 2.3. How does ageing affect productivity growth? 80
Box 2.4. What role do policies play in sustaining fertility rates? 81
Box 2.5. Growth potential of closing gender gaps in hours worked per worker 86
Box 2.6. Gender gaps in unpaid work 88
Box 3.1. Jobs differ in how desirable they are for older workers 149
Box 3.2. Creating more flexibility in retirement in Denmark 162
Box 3.3. Good Recruitment for Older Workers (GROW) Toolkit 167
Box 3.4. Supporting age management in firms in Austria 171
Box 3.5. Early intervention health programmes 175
Box 3.6. Preventing workplace injury and job redesign 176
Box 4.1. Skills are related to employment rates and wages 210
Box 4.2. As workers get older, they tend to take on greater managerial and influencing responsibilities, especially in the early phases of their careers 213
Box 4.3. Barriers to training participation differ across age groups 221
Box 4.4. Lower job mobility of older workers might be contributing to lower learning-by-doing 224
Box 4.5. Career advice services for adults in Belgium, Singapore and Switzerland 227
Box 4.6. Support to participate in adult learning for mid-career individuals in Singapore 230
Box 5.1. Mobility concepts 252
Box 5.2. The slowdown in productivity growth within firms in selected OECD countries 256
Box 5.3. Methodology I: Growth-enhancing job reallocation 259
Box 5.4. Methodology II: Decomposing aggregate growth 262
Box 5.5. Labour shortages and job reallocation in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis in Austria 264
Box 5.6. Methodology III: Comparing aggregate growth rates across countries 267
Box 5.7. Methodology IV: The role of ageing in the evolution of aggregate growth 269
Box 5.8. The economic effects of restrictions on non-compete agreements and the role of policy design: The case of Austria 276
Box 5.9. The role of pay transparency measures in growth-enhancing job reallocation 278
Infographics 13
Infographic 1. Key facts and figures 16
Annex Tables 13
Annex Table 5.A.1. Real average annual growth rates in labour productivity, average wages and median wages by country group and period 290
Annex Table 5.A.2. Difference in annual growth rates in labour productivity, average wages and median wages by country group and period 291
Annex Table 5.A.3. Data sources 293
Annex Figures 12
Annex Figure 1.A.1. Employment rates have increased for prime aged and older individuals but not for the young 51
Annex Figure 1.A.2. The share of working-age migrants in employment has increased 52
Annex Figure 1.A.3. Change in the incidence of part-time employment, alternative periods 53
Annex Figure 1.A.4. Labour market tightness increased sharply between 2021 and 2022 54
Annex Figure 1.A.5. Nominal and real wage index by country since Q4 2019 55
Annex Figure 1.A.6. Growth in real wages in selected OECD countries resulting from collective agreements 59
Annex Figure 1.A.7. Minimum wage evolution, January 2021 to April 2025 61
Annex Figure 1.A.8. Change in real wage by industry in some non-euro area OECD countries 64
Annex Figure 2.A.1. Evolution of the ratio of old-age to working-age population, 2023-60 117
Annex Figure 2.A.2. GDP per capita growth is correlated with indicators of living standards 118
Annex Figure 2.A.3. Productivity growth in the 1990s 119
Annex Figure 2.A.4. Migration rates, past and projected 119
Annex Figure 2.A.5. Closing the gender gap in employment requires large increases in female employment rates 120
Annex Figure 2.A.6. Higher-employment-of-older-workers: the case in which the employment rate of a given country is above those in the lowest-exit-rate... 120
Annex Figure 2.A.7. Accounting for the intensive margin has limited effect on the growth potential of old-age people in most countries 121
Annex Figure 2.A.8. Activating older workers could lead to large increases in employment rates 122
Annex Figure 2.A.9. Mobilising untapped human resources and improving productivity growth would restore GDP per capita growth 123
Annex Figure 2.A.10. Pensions and health account for the bulk of public social expenditure 124
Annex Figure 2.A.11. Net childcare costs for full-time care at a typical childcare centre 125
Annex Figure 2.A.12. Accounting for housing costs amplifies the difference in poverty rates between older people and children, both in levels and in trends 126
Annex Figure 3.A.1. Employment rates are rising among older adults across birth cohorts 189
Annex Figure 3.A.2. Employment rates have risen for mid-to-late career workers across most OECD countries 189
Annex Figure 3.A.3. Employment rates have risen irrespective of educational attainment in most OECD countries 190
Annex Figure 3.A.4. Employment rates are highly correlated with education at age 65-69 191
Annex Figure 3.A.5. The incidence of unemployment and long-term unemployment by age, 2024 192
Annex Figure 3.A.6. Rates of inactivity remain substantial across OECD countries at older ages 193
Annex Figure 3.A.7. Women with low education have nearly four times the inactivity rate of tertiary-educated peers 194
Annex Figure 3.A.8. Likelihood of working longer, by employment stability in one's 50s and education 195
Annex Figure 3.A.9. There are significant differences in "age-friendliness" of occupations 196
Annex Figure 3.A.10. Average usual hours worked have declined for full-time workers in most OECD countries 197
Annex Figure 3.A.11. Low educated workers are more likely to be working part-time because they cannot find a full-time job 198
Annex Figure 3.A.12. Age of effective labour market exit varies considerably across OECD countries 198
Annex Figure 3.A.13. High hiring rates can reflect low rates of employee retention 199
Annex Figure 3.A.14. Illness is a major reason for jobless older workers leaving a job 200
Annex Figure 4.A.1. Literacy scores are lower among older people 239
Annex Figure 4.A.2. The decline in skills proficiency over the last 10 years differs significantly across occupations 240
Annex Figure 4.A.3. The physical intensity of jobs differs across occupations 241
Annex Figure 4.A.4. The share of jobs that require working physically decreased in most OECD countries, while the share of high-skilled occupations increased 242
Annex Figure 4.A.5. Training participation and learning-by-doing differ across education levels 243
Annex Figure 4.A.6. The share of the population that participated in training less than they wanted to decreases with age 244
Annex Figure 4.A.7. Learning-by-doing differs across countries 244
Annex Figure 5.A.1. Annualised change in hourly productivity and wages within and between industries 294
Annex Figure 5.A.2. Accounting for the role of mobility for cross-country differences in aggregate growth rates 295
Annex Figure 5.A.3. Time trends in responsiveness 296
Annex Figure 5.A.4. Accounting for the role of dispersion and responsiveness for cross-country differences in aggregate growth rates 297
Annex Figure 5.A.5. The age-composition of employment has undergone significant change since 2000 298