LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  9

LIST OF BOXES  11

LIST OF FIGURES  11

LIST OF TABLES  11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  12

1. INTRODUCTION  16

1.1. Strategic context  16

1.1.1. Not a simple commodity  16

1.1.2. A volatile geopolitical landscape  16

1.1.3. Policymakers are doubling down on critical materials  18

1.2. Objectives and methodological approach  19

1.2.1. Objectives  19

1.2.2. Methodology  19

1.3. Key differences between the EU and the US terminology and scope  20

2. VALUE-CHAIN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS  22

2.1. Upstream extraction  24

2.2. Midstream processing  25

2.3. Downstream manufacturing  26

2.4. Recycling and circularity as a cross-cutting dimension  27

2.5. Dynamic criticality: why supply-chain analysis must be continuous  29

2.6. Sectoral applications: defence, space, semiconductors, transport and clean energy  30

2.6.1. Defence and national security  30

2.6.2. Space industries  30

2.6.3. Semiconductors and advanced electronics  31

2.6.4. Transport and electromobility  31

2.6.5. Clean-energy and power systems  31

2.7. Structural conclusions: the midstream gap as the master vulnerability  32

3. US RAW MATERIAL STRATEGY  33

3.1. Understanding the US governance architecture of critical raw materials  33

3.1.1. Strategic direction and coordination  34

3.1.2. Definition and mineral intelligence  34

3.1.3. Industrial development and technology  34

3.1.4. Defence and security  35

3.1.5. Fiscal incentives, financing and investments  35

3.1.6. External engagement  36

3.1.7. Legislative authority and oversight  36

3.2. Building the US critical minerals policy (2017–2024)  37

3.2.1. Phase 1: strategic recognition and framework-building (2017–2020)  38

3.2.2. Phase 2: integration into supply-chain resilience and industrial policy (2021–2022)  39

3.2.3. Phase 3: implementation, coordination and system constraints (2023–2024)  39

3.3. US critical minerals policy under the second Trump administration (2025–2026)  40

3.3.1. Executive coordination and centralisation  41

3.3.2. Congressional reinforcement since 2025  42

3.4. External dimension and diplomatic-security initiatives  44

3.4.1. From MSP to FORGE  44

3.4.2. Project Vault, financing and the new strategic reserve logic  45

3.4.3. Bilateral agreements: structure and rationale  47

3.4.4. Pax Silica  49

4. COMPARATIVE POLICY-DESIGN ANALYSIS: THE UNITED STATES VS THE EU  52

4.1. Funding: contrasting scale and instruments  52

4.2. Stockpiling  55

4.2.1. Key differences  55

4.2.2. Strategic considerations  57

4.2.3. The operationalisation of an EU stockpiling framework  57

4.2.4. Monitoring and oversight  57

4.2.5. Systemic readiness  58

4.2.6. Company preparedness  58

4.2.7. Coordination  59

4.2.8. Crisis management  59

4.2.9. CRM stockpiling pilot  59

4.2.10. Stockpiles in EU Member States  59

4.3. Price floors and other price-support instruments  60

4.3.1. US: price floors supported by trade measures  60

4.3.2. Tariffs for the implementation of price floors  60

4.3.3. If you want to go far, go together  61

4.3.4. EU: focus on price stabilisation  61

4.3.5. Joint purchasing  61

4.3.6. Stockpiling  62

4.3.7. Lack of revenue-stabilisation tools  62

4.3.8. The "Middle Way": Contracts for Difference mechanisms  63

4.3.9. No one-size-fits-all solution  64

5. PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES  66

5.1. Parliament position  66

5.2. Relevance for IMCO  66

5.2.1. Single market integrity and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation  67

5.2.2. Intra-EU investment distortion from asymmetric national CRM support  68

5.2.3. Public procurement as a demand-side CRM instrument  69

5.2.4. US tax credit architecture and single market fragmentation risk  69

5.2.5. Single market access conditionalities for CRM  70

5.2.6. Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act  71

5.3. Relevance for ITRE  72

5.3.1. De-risking and financing CRM projects  72

5.3.2 Sustaining competitiveness despite the "stability premium"  73

5.3.3. Leveraging ESG, defence and decarbonisation to strengthen CRM value chains  75

5.3.4. Importance of identifying the entire supply chain of CRMs  76

5.3.5. The EU's potential across the value chain  77

5.3.6. Recycling and circular economy-based supply chains  82

5.3.7. CRM list: where to start?  84

5.3.8. Fit-for-purpose stockpiling  85

6. CONCLUSION  89

6.1. US critical minerals strategy: from framework-building to direct market intervention  89

6.2. US institutional architecture: distributed mandates, centralised coordination  90

6.3. Value-chain assessment: the criticality of the midstream gap  90

6.4. Comparison of US and EU governance models  91

6.5. Market access, industrial policy and security: conditioned openness and critical minerals agreements  91

6.6. Cross-cutting finding I: China as structural third actor  92

6.7. Cross-cutting finding II: the speed mismatch between supply-chain leverage and industrial policy response  93

6.8. Cross-cutting finding III: closing the financing, institutional and governance gaps  93

KEY REFERENCES  95